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WE REAP WHAT WE SOW:  
THE LEGAL LIABILITY RISKS OF  





TIME magazine recently declared:  
Biotech is the most rapidly adopted crop technology in human 
history—faster than the corn hybrids introduced in the U.S. in the 
1930s and faster than the planting changes that took place during 
the Green Revolution.1  
The latest daunting statistics for the planting of genetically modified (GM) 
crops confirm “Monsanto’s stranglehold on the planet’s food chain”: 740 million 
acres (300 million hectacres), equally divided between North America and the rest of 
the world, mostly in Argentina and Brazil.2 In 1996, two percent of U.S. soybeans 
had the Monsanto Roundup Ready® gene; in 2008, over 90 percent of the soybeans 
grown in the United States contained this gene.3 In total, the current figures for GM 
crops commercialized in the United States are astonishing: soy (91%), cotton (71%), 
canola (88%), corn (85%), sugar beets (90%), Hawaiian papaya (more than 50%), 
alfalfa (currently on hold), zucchini and yellow squash (small amount), and tobacco 
(Quest® brand).4 As a consequence, the list of foods on the U.S. shelves that contain a 
genetically modified ingredient is extensive, including the myriad of products derived 
from any of these soybeans or corn.5 
                                                 
Copyright © 2010, Debra M. Strauss. 
*
 Associate Professor of Business Law, Charles F. Dolan School of Business, Fairfield University; B.A., 
Cornell University; J.D., Yale Law School. Professor Strauss, a former Food and Drug Law Institute 
Scholar, currently teaches the legal environment of business, international law, and law and ethics. She has 
also developed a course on the international law and ethics of genetically modified food.  
1 Ken Stier, Global Business: How Frankenfood Prevailed, TIME, June 28, 2010, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1997448,00.html. 
2 Id.  
3 Food, Inc., directed by Robert Kenner (Magnolia Pictures 2009); see also Stephanie E. Cox, Note, 
Genetically Modified Organisms: Who Should Pay the Price for Pollen Drift Contamination?, 13 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 401, 406 (2008) (noting 20% increase yearly in organics sales). With its Roundup Ready® seed, 
Monsanto infuses each cell with a resistance to the herbicide Roundup Ready®, also sold by Monsanto. 
When the fields are sprayed with this glyphosate herbicide, the weeds are killed and the GM crops are left 
standing. The resulting food products retain this herbicide resistance at the genetic level. See Debra M. 
Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Importing Caution into the U.S. 
Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 167, 167 (2006) [hereinafter Strauss, Importing Caution]. 
4 Institute for Responsible Technology (IRT), GMOs in Food, http://www.responsible technology.org/ 
GMFree/GMODangers/GMOsinFood/index.cfm (last visited July 30, 2010) (providing a summary list of 
crops, foods, and food ingredients that have been genetically modified as of May 2010); see also National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Agricultural Statistics Board, U.S. Department of Agriculture: 
Acreage (2009), available at http://www.responsible technology.org/document Files/222.pdf? (providing 
information concerning total U.S. acreage of corn, soy, wheat, and cotton). 
5 IRT, supra note 4. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are created when the genes of one organism are 
inserted into the DNA of another organism, causing the target trait to be expressed in that non-related species. 





None of these products are labeled as containing genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs).6 The U.S. market readily accepts these genetically engineered 
crops, while overseas they face more restrictions and fewer regulatory approvals, 
although some say that has been quietly changing.7 Reflecting public attitudes as to 
who should bear the risk of potential harm, “GM free zones” where GM crops cannot 
be planted have been announced in countries throughout the world.8 
In the United States, Monsanto has a 35% market share in corn seed, with its 
GM traits implanted in 85% of all U.S. corn due to the licensing of its technology.9 
With its profits recently dropping due to increased competition from China of its 
herbicide glyphosate and a farmer backlash against high-priced GM seeds, Monsanto 
plans to push its GM seeds even more aggressively by lowering prices for two 
recently introduced lines of GM seeds (a second generation of its Roundup® tolerant 
soybean and a line of herbicide-resistant and pest-resistant corn called SmartStax).10 
Monsanto is counting on U.S. farmers to buy enough of this Roundup Ready®  
2 Yield to plant about 15 million acres for the 2011 growing season.11 In addition, the 
biotechnology industry has been capitalizing on fears of a food shortage crisis based 
on population growth projections and the vulnerability of the global food supply to 
weather and potential catastrophic events.12 The industry can be expected to continue 
to exploit these fears to push further adoption of their GM crops. 
                                                                                                                    
The genetically modified (GM) plants then produce GM foods and ingredients, which now occupy a vast 
majority of food products on U.S. grocery store shelves. In addition to herbicide-resistant varieties of soybeans, 
canola, cotton, corn, radicchio, rice, and sugar beet, genes derived from a bacterium in the soil used as an 
insecticide, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), have been inserted into crops to induce the plant to produce a toxin 
against certain insects, producing Bt-corn, Bt-cotton, Bt-potatoes, Bt-rice, and Bt-tomatoes. The United States 
has also approved virus- resistant varieties of papaya, potato, and squash, along with tomato and cantaloupe 
varieties containing a gene that slows the ripening process to allow fruit to ripen longer on the vine. See Strauss, 
Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 167-68 (explaining this technology and examples of GM crops). 
6 See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 182-89 (discussing the U.S. laissez-faire regulatory 
treatment of GMOs). 
7 As Brett Begemann, international executive vice president at Monsanto explains about the gradual and 
silent penetration of the European market, “Neither the government nor companies seem to see much 
upside in being more candid with the public.” Stier, supra note 1. While none are as openly welcoming to 
GM crops as the United States, there are now twenty-five countries that have planted biotech crops and an 
additional thirty-two countries that have approved biotech imports for either animal feed or food. Id. 
8 “Nearly two thousand jurisdictions in 22 countries in Europe have declared themselves GM free zones 
and the same holds true for parts of New Zealand, most states in Australia, Venezuela, most of Brazil, 
Angola, Sudan, and Zambia.” Jeffrey M. Smith, “The Myth and Necessity of GM Free Zones,” Spilling the 
Beans, Oct 1, 2004, http://www.seedsofdeception.com/utility/showArticle/?ObjectID=195&find 
=prodigene&happ=siteAdministrator [hereinafter Smith, Myth] (citing Stefania Bianchi, Anti-GM 
Movement Spreads Across Europe, INTER. PRESS SERVICE, April 22, 2004). 
9 Id. Although Monsanto holds the lead in the GM seed market and maintains a $1 billion R&D budget, 
internationally other companies currently include Switzerland’s Syngenta, Pioneer Hi-Bred International 
which is part of DuPont, Dow AgroSciences and Germany’s Bayer CropScience. “Competitors can become 
cross-licensing collaborators, even partners” as the companies seek to maximize their GM seed profits. Id. 
10 Scott Kilman, Monsanto’s Profit Drops 45% on Roundup Woes, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748703426004575338602676667626.html. 
11 Id.  
12 See, e.g., David Thier, Is the Next Global Food Crisis Now in the Making?, July 17, 2010, available at 
http://www.aolnews.com/world/article/is-the-next-global-food-crisis-now-in-the-making/19557228. 






Monsanto vigorously enforces its intellectual property rights, relentlessly 
pursuing farmers with seed contracts and lawsuits against any whose fields end up 
sprouting their genetically modified crops.13 Clearly Monsanto has already established 
its dominance in ownership. But with great ownership comes great responsibility—and 
liability. The biotech industry claims that after almost fifteen years of GM crop use, 
there are no well-documented food-safety problems and no threat to biodiversity.14 
However, these claims are contradicted by reported incidents of superweeds and 
contamination, with potentially catastrophic events lurking on the horizon not too far-
fetched to envision.  
Despite the many promises of the prospective benefits of this technology 
that have not materialized, numerous risks to human health and the environment have 
been identified.15 Potential risks include crop failures suffered by farmers, cross 
pollination of neighboring farms, and increased insect resistance, as well as health 
and environmental impacts on consumers.16 The National Research Council has 
detailed the possible hazards that GM crops may pose in comparison to traditional 
crop breeding methods.17 In citing the potential dangers of this technology, a study by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) identified additional costs from the issues of 
liability and compensation for economic loss due to contamination.18 Indeed, one of 
                                                 
13 See Debra M. Strauss, The Application of TRIPS to GMOs: International Intellectual Property Rights 
and Biotechnology, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 287, 299 (2009) (analyzing the intellectual property treatment of 
genetically engineered seeds as asserted by the industry and proposing a model that would 
promote constructive innovation for the public benefit by encouraging “socially responsible technology”) 
[hereinafter Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights]; see also Food, Inc., supra note 3 (noting 
that Monsanto has a staff of seventy-five for investigating the use of their seeds with private investigators 
and a hotline to report neighbors; their frequent lawsuits for patent infringement prompt settlements with 
farmers vastly outmatched in resources and scare the other farmers into compliance). 
14 Stier, supra note 1. 
15 See Debra M. Strauss, Defying Nature: The Ethical Implications of Genetically Modified Plants, 3 J. 
FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 7–19 (2007) (debunking the myths that this technology would reduce world hunger, 
decrease pesticide usage, improve nutritional content, and increase farmers’ income and contrasting these 
claims of potential benefits with the risks) [hereinafter Strauss, Ethical Implications]. 
16 Concerns in the international community have focused particularly on allergenicity, antibiotic resistance, 
gastrointestinal problems, potential gene flow to other organisms, and destruction of biodiversity. For more 
background information on this technology, including the health and environmental risks, see Strauss, 
Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 169-75. See also Jeffrey M. Smith, Monsanto Whistleblower Says 
Genetically Engineered Crops May Cause Disease, Spilling the Beans, August 2006, available at 
http://www.seedsofdeception.com/Public/ Newsletter/Aug2006-MonsantoWhistleblowerSaysG/index.cfm 
[hereinafter Smith, Whistleblower] (former Monsanto employee reporting that in GM cotton unknown 
proteins had been created during the gene insertion process—“one of the many possible dangers that are 
not being evaluated by the biotech industry’s superficial safety assessments”). 
17 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND 
REGULATION 40-103 (2000) (analyzing the potential environmental and human health implications of pest-
protected plants and recommending further study). 
18 World Health Organization (WHO), Modern Food Biotechnology, Human Health and Development: an 
Evidence-Based Study, at 53 (June 24, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/ 
biotech/biotech_en.pdf. The WHO study also named the following human health risks: direct health effects 
(toxicity), tendencies to provoke allergic reaction (allergenicity), specific components with toxic 
properties, the stability of the inserted gene, nutritional impact, increased antibiotic resistance, and any 





the most significant risks to consider is future liability from lawsuits, including 
lawsuits by and against farmers and/or biotechnology companies for possible harm 
and economic loss caused by bioengineered food crops. In view of the scientific 
uncertainty and potential for harm, consumer claims for injuries may also arise in the 
future from the failure to warn of the presence of genetically engineered components.  
In analyzing the legal liability risks of GM crops and food, Part II of this 
article first explores the theories of liability under which farmers and consumers can 
recover for the harms caused by GMOs, including relief for their economic loss.  
In Part III, this article examines the very real incidents thus far and analyzes the 
lawsuits that have ensued in cases of contamination due to pollen drift and 
intermingling of seeds, highlighting the most recent landmark LibertyLink® rice 
litigation. Also explored are the roles of suppliers, trade associations, and 
international trade, as well as bills that have been introduced at the federal and state 
levels. Part IV presents policy considerations and discusses measures to manage these 
risks, proposing a regulatory approach of labeling, monitoring, and a stringent pre-
market approval process. New legislation, preferably at the federal level, would give 
more clarity to the business community and assurance to consumers, farmers, and 
other stakeholders. In the absence of a stronger regulatory and statutory regime, the 
common law of torts will step in to fill the void through continual lawsuits that will 
plague the biotech industry. Accordingly, Part V concludes that the interests of GM 
seed companies, farmers, and consumers will converge in this area to mandate greater 
certainty and safety. 
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR HARM CAUSED BY GMOS 
Theories of liability that may be applied in cases of harm caused by GMOs 
vary with the type of harm, context, and parties potentially injured as well those legally 
responsible for causing the problem. Some attention has been focused on potential 
liability for farmers who decide to plant GM crops, which might be contract-based 
liability that may arise under their technology agreements with seed companies or 
guarantees to crop purchasers or regulatory liability if their actions involve violations of 
statutes or the standards and procedures issued by administrative agencies such as 
approval for human consumption.19 Farmers who plant GM crops may also be liable 
under tort-based theories when genetic drift or outcrossing occurs and the seed spreads to 
the fields of other farmers who had no desire to plant GM crops and now face problems 
                                                                                                                    
unintended effects that could result from genetic modification. In addition, the study warned of potential 
risks for the environment such as: “unintended effects on non-target organisms, ecosystems, and 
biodiversity.” Id. at iii, 20; see also Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 169-70. 
19 See DAVID R. MOELLER, GMO LIABILITY THREATS FOR FARMERS: LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE 
PLANTING OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 2 (Farmers’ Legal Action Group, Inc. 2001) (focusing the 
potential legal risks farmers face with genetically modified organisms). For example, a farmer who 
warrantees that the crops were GMO-free may face liability for the buyer’s expenses to reject and replace 
the crops, including further damages if the GM crop mingles with and contaminates other crops—possibly 
entire shipments to foreign countries. Id. 






of contamination.20 In addition, as noted above, there have been numerous cases based 
upon the intellectual property rights of the seed manufacturers, who have successfully 
sued the farmers of the recipient fields for patent infringement despite their lack of intent 
or desire to plant the patented GM seed.21 However, these types of claims only address 
legal risks to farmers and not the seed companies who have created these products. 
Another approach to harm caused by GM crops would direct liability onto 
the seed manufacturers in potential lawsuits by non-GM farmers and even consumers. 
This tort-based liability would include claims for contamination on behalf of farmers 
whose fields have been tainted with unwanted GMOs due to outcrossing, migration, 
commingling of seeds and the like. In empowering these farmers with a proactive 
cause of action, it must be acknowledged that the ensuing lawsuits both by and 
possibly against a different group of farmers—non-GM versus GM—at times would 
pit neighbor against neighbor for breach of their genetic fences.22 Nonetheless, the 
emphasis here is on the defendant seed company who set this situation in motion, 
and, faced with the strong possibility of this form of liability, those farmers are 
theoretically free to choose not to plant GM seeds in the future. The damages may be 
high—especially if the plaintiff farmers face potential loss of organic certification—
both on the individual farmers’ level for injury to their crop and on the market level 
for loss of a domestic or international export market.  
In lawsuits for contamination from cross pollination, one can easily envision 
liability through common law torts such as private and public nuisance, trespass, 
negligence, and strict liability.23 For example, the situation could be viewed as a 
trespass if a farmer and/or seed company knew that genetic traits from a GM crop 
could enter a neighbor’s property and that genetic drift does in fact occur, causing 
harm from contamination of the crop.24 Although the trespass theory has been 
successfully applied in current times to other instances of pollution, on the theory that 
such physical invasion of particles interferes with one’s exclusive possession of the 
                                                 
20 Id.; see generally Stephanie M. Bernhardt, High Plains Drifting: Wind-Blown Seeds and the Intellectual 
Property Implications of the GMO Revolution, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 2, 2–6 (2005) (discussing 
this type of lawsuit and facts about windblown seeds). 
21 See Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 291-95 (discussing this use of 
U.S. patent law).  
22 But see Joshua B. Cannon, Note, Statutory Stones and Regulatory Mortar: Using Negligence Per Se to 
Mend the Wall Between Farmers Growing Genetically Engineered Crops and their Neighbors, 67 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 653, 657 (2010) (proposing negligence per se, or statutory negligence, as a possible solution 
to protect farmers whose crops are contaminated because the predictability of statutory or regulatory 
standards would also benefit GM growers).  
23 See generally Drew L. Keshen, Legal Liability Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, 10 ENVTL. 
LIABILITY 203 (2002) (discussing trespass, negligence, and strict liability). 
24 See MOELLER, supra note 19, at 3; Cox, supra note 3, at 411 (exploring possible causes of action for 
pollen-drift contamination of organic or conventional crops through private nuisance, trespass, or strict 
liability, and proposing state legislation to protect farmers by holding growers and manufacturers liable for 
the harm); Paul J. Heald & James Charles Smith, The Problem of Social Cost in a Genetically Modified 
Age, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (2006) (discussing the elements of trespass in the context of pollen drift as 
requiring proof of invasion, causation, and harm). 





land, the issue of whether mere knowledge is enough or intentionality must be proven 
has not been determined in this context.25 Similarly, a nuisance action would be based 
on the claim that there was an invasion of the farmer’s use and enjoyment of his 
land.26 A proposal to utilize the tort theory of anticipatory nuisance is appealing, as it 
would allow injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring in the first instance. 27 
However, the high standard necessary for an injunction to issue might not be 
achievable as a practical matter in many cases.28 
Strict liability for an unreasonably dangerous product would be particularly 
appropriate, as it would not require proof of intent or negligence on the part of the 
manufacturer and the causation of harm would be sufficient.29 Courts have held strict 
liability to apply to comparably dangerous activities such as spraying pesticides.30 
Moreover, what constitutes an “abnormally dangerous product” involves a balancing 
test that would require the court to consider public policy interests.31 Arguably, as a 
matter of public policy holding seed companies strictly liable would place 
responsibility on those best able to control the product and ensure its safety, 
providing proper incentives to prevent the harm from occurring in the future. 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and Ownership of Genetically Modified 
Organisms, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 618 (2004); Richard Repp, Comment, Biotech Pollution: Assessing 
Liability for Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 585, 600 (2000). 
26 Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law and the Prevention of “Genetic Pollution”: 
Declining a Dinner Date with Damocles, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 328, 337 (2000) (applying nuisance law to 
GM varieties not approved in EU, reasoning that a defendant who does not take reasonable steps to prevent 
an interference with plaintiff’s enjoyment of property may be liable in nuisance); A. Bryan Endres, 
“GMO:” Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary Obligation? The Liability Schemes for 
GMO Damages in the United States and the European Union, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 
493-94 (2000) (noting that for private nuisance, a plaintiff may not need to demonstrate that the defendant 
intended to allow pollen from genetically modified crops to cross-pollinate, and courts may refuse to 
balance the genetically modified crop’s social and economic utility against its harm to the organic farmer’s 
crops); Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PENN. L. REV. 
1403, 1466 (1983) (utilizing common law nuisance and injunctive measures a mechanism for governing 
hazard). But see Neil Craik, Keith Culver & Norman Siebrasse, Genetically Modified Crops and Nuisance: 
Exploring the Role of Precaution in Private Law, 27 BUL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 202, 206 (2007) (arguing that 
in nuisance suits for genetic contamination from GM crops, private law is poorly suited to apply the 
diffuse, policy-based risk allocation considerations raised by the precautionary principle). 
27 Margaret Rosso Grossman, Anticipatory Nuisance and the Prevention of Environmental Harm and 
Economic Loss from GMOs in the United States, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 107, 124 (2008) (reviewing 
private and public nuisance in the context of GMOs and analyzing the suitability of anticipatory nuisance 
seeking an injunction to prevent future harm from a defendant’s proposed activity). 
28 But see John T. Walsh & Thomas P. Redick, Managing Agricultural Risks in Biopharming: The Role of 
Injunctions, 7 ABA AGRIC. MGMT. COM. NEWSL. 15, 15 (2003) (“the fact of future predictable losses of 
the same character, clearly create sufficient factual precedent for a threat of “irreparable harm” to merit an 
injunction against similar crops prior to sale”). 
29 See Carie-Megan Flood, Note, Pollen Drift and Potential Causes of Action, 28 J. CORP. L. 473, 477-82 
(2003) (recommending the trespass liability theory as suitable for claims by an individual plaintiff farmer 
and strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities as more appropriate where the damage extended 
beyond the individual farmer to the mass population). 
30 MOELLER, supra note 19, at 4; Endres, supra note 26, at 488-91 (analyzing strict liability cases in similar 
contexts). 
31 Cox, supra note 3, at 410-11. 






Ultimately, tort-based liability of seed manufacturers and GM farmers to 
consumers, environmental organizations, trade associations, and the government may 
arise for harm to human health and the environment.32 Consumer claims for injuries may 
also arise in the future from the failure to warn of the presence of genetically engineered 
components.33 In view of the scientific uncertainty and potential for harm, the 
possibilities of major catastrophic incidents and future health claims are infinite. From a 
risk assessment point of view, biotech companies should have cause for concern. 
III.   RECENT INCIDENTS AND LAWSUITS SEEKING REDRESS 
The logical gap between ownership and liability has long been illustrated by 
the pollen-drift cases, where farmers have been aggressively sued under the patent 
infringement laws by Monsanto for the unintentional seed drift into their fields.34 The 
biotech company has notoriously prevailed despite the fact the farmers did not intend 
to use the genetically modified seed and might have suffered economic loss from the 
contamination, particularly if the farm was organic.35 Commentators have argued that 
such a scenario could more appropriately be viewed as contamination and warrant a 
countersuit by the farmer.36 As a matter of public policy, shifting legal liability onto 
the companies in the best position in terms of knowledge and control would provide 
the economic incentive for them to take adequate measures to prevent such pollen 
drift in the future.37 Recent developments in case law suggest that such a shift has 
begun to take hold. Moreover, the voices of suppliers and trade associations have 
begun to impact these practices, along with the predominance of concerns for 
international trade. Yet the question remains whether the voice of consumers and 
non-GM farmers will, as a consequence, be heard through future U.S. legislation. 
                                                 
32 See generally Tana N. Vollendorf, Comment, Genetically Modified Organisms: Someone is in the 
Kitchen with DNA—Who is Responsible When Someone Gets Burned?, 21 MISS. C.L. REV. 43 (2001). 
33 See generally Katherine Van Tassel, The Introduction of Biotech Food to the Tort System: Creating a 
New Duty to Identify, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1645 (2004).  
34 See Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 298. The case of Percy 
Schmeiser, a Canadian farmer aggressively pursued by Monsanto for patent infringement despite his lack 
of intention and the fact that his own long developed crop of corn was mutated by the Monsanto seed, is 
one of many dramatic examples. Id. at 295-97. 
35 Id. at 297 (theorizing that the inequity of resources has prevented farmers from pursuing their legal rights 
in this area). 
36 See, e.g., Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 299; Margaret R. 
Grossman, Biotechnology, Property Rights and the Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 247 (2002) 
(discussing common-law tort actions as a remedy to the general public and to property owners who have 
suffered economic losses from cross-pollution and commingling, “especially when growers plant GM 
crops not approved for all uses and by important trading partners”). 
37 Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 297; see also Tim Van Pelt,  
Is Changing Patent Infringement Liability the Appropriate Mechanism for Allocating the Cost of Pollen 
Drift?, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 567, 577–78 (2006) (arguing that, because the pollen drift generates costs for 
the farmers who want to avoid passive infringement or who want to preserve genetic purity in their crops, 
the patent holder should be forced to internalize the costs related to the spread of its own patented genes). 





A. The Farmers Strike Back: LibertyLink® Rice 
Most significantly, the theory of liability for contamination has now been 
successfully applied by the courts in the landmark LibertyLink® rice lawsuits on 
behalf of farmers whose fields have been contaminated with unwanted GMOs due to 
outcrossing and migration, imposing multimillion dollar jury verdicts on the biotech 
company Bayer CropScience for its negligence in recklessly allowing this spread and 
the resulting harm to the U.S. long-grain rice crop.  
LibertyLink® rice (LL 601), a variety of genetically modified rice from the 
United States that was in an experimental trial phase and not approved for human 
consumption, was found on supermarket shelves in the EU.38 The experimental rice 
was genetically modified to withstand higher doses of the Liberty® weed killer 
glufosinate, itself a controversial pesticide that may soon be banned from Europe as 
toxic.39 Trace amounts of the LibertyLink® rice had somehow entered the commercial 
rice supply in all five of the Southern states that grow long-grain rice: Arkansas, 
Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri. By the time Bayer informed the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), which announced the contamination in August 
2006, the unapproved rice had crossed into food products.40 As a result, Japan and the 
European Union (EU) placed strict limits on U.S. rice imports, with European nations 
requiring extensive testing to show lack of contamination and Japan banning 
American rice altogether; U.S. rice prices dropped dramatically. Within four days of 
the announcement, a decline in rice futures reportedly had cost U.S. growers about  
$150 million and by September, rice prices had declined 10 percent.41  
In a highly unusual move, the USDA hastily “deregulated” the genetically 
modified rice retroactively, despite the fact that the vast majority of the comments it 
received on its proposed decision in September opposed the nonregulated status.42  
                                                 
38 See Physorg.com, GM Rice from U.S. found in EU, Sept. 13, 2006, 
http://www.physorg.com/news77388811.html (genetically modified rice from the United States discovered 
in the EU, in violation of a ban on import, growth and sale of such crops.). 
39 Canadian Biotechnology Action Network (CBAN), Hands off Our Rice. Protect the World’s Most 
Important Food From Genetic Engineering, April 15, 2009, HEALTH ACTION NETWORK SOCIETY (HANS),  
https://www.hans.org/magazine/488/engineering-important-genetic-protect.  
We ask all governments around the world to protect consumers and farmers, their 
crops and fields by rejecting Bayer’s GE rice, and to stop GE rice field trials . . . 
Rice is daily food for half of the world’s population. Genetically engineered (GE) 
rice, on the other hand, is a threat to our health, our agriculture and our biodiversity. 
Id. 
40 Marc Gunther, Attack of the Mutant Rice, FORTUNE, July 9, 2007, at 74, 76. 
41 Rick Weiss, Gene-altered Profit-killer: A Slight Taint of Biotech Rice Puts Farmers’ Overseas Sales in 
Peril, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2006, at D01; see also U.S. Rice Producers Association, Secretary Johanns: 
“Give Our Farmers Good Access to World Markets…,” THE RICE ADVOCATE, July 8, 2005, at 1. 
42 The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture cleared 
the LLRICE601 (LibertyLink®) strain for human use on November 24, 2006 (71 Fed. Reg. 70360-70372). 
The published notice of its preliminary decision in September had prompted 15,871 comments, of which 
15,517 opposed this nonregulated status. See Regulatory Affairs—Agricultural and Environmental: 
Lawsuits over Liberty Link Rice Consolidated, 26 BIOTECH L. REP. 20 (2007); see also Rachel Iadicicco & 






Its investigation into the how the LibertyLink® rice entered the nation’s long-grain 
rice supply—an inquiry it considered to be independent of the approval process—
remains inconclusive.43 This withdrawal of U.S. government oversight further 
exacerbated the international trade issue.44 Roughly half of the U.S. rice crop, which 
was worth about $1.9 billion the previous year, is exported; and European and Asian 
markets have erected barriers that reflect their consumers’ rejection of genetically 
modified foods.45 
A class-action lawsuit was filed on May 17, 2007 by rice farmers in 
Arkansas, Missouri, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas against Bayer CropScience, 
alleging its genetically modified rice contaminated the crop and caused severe 
economic loss.46 In the Complaint, the rice producers assert, among other claims, 
public nuisance, private nuisance, negligence per se (based on violations of federal 
and state statutory law), negligence, strict liability for ultrahazardous activities and 
                                                                                                                    
Jerry Redding, Press Release, USDA: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), USDA 
Deregulates Line of Genetically Engineered Rice, Nov. 24, 2006, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ 
newsroom/content/2006/11/rice_deregulate.shtml. The USDA press release noted that: “[d]eregulated 
items and their progeny are considered safe for the environment and can be grown without APHIS 
oversight.” Id.  
43 See USDA APHIS, Report: “Report of LibertyLink Rice Incidents,” Oct. 5, 2007, 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2007/10/content/printable/RiceReport10-2007.pdf; USDA 
APHIS Lessons Learned: “APHIS’ Biotechnology Framework,” Oct. 5, 2007, 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2007/10/content/ printable/LessonsLearned10-2007.pdf; 
FDA, CFSAN/Office of Food Additive Safety, “U.S. Food and Drug Administration's Statement on Report 
of Bioengineered Rice in the Food Supply,” Aug. 2006, http://www.fda.gov/Food/Biotechnology/ 
Announcements/ucm109411.htm. 
This rice variety, not intended for commercialization, was not submitted to FDA for 
evaluation under the Agency's voluntary biotechnology consultation process . . . 
Based on the available data and information, FDA has concluded that the presence 
of this bioengineered rice variety in the food and feed supply poses no food or feed 
safety concerns. 
Id. 
44 Gunther, supra note 40, at 77; Christopher Lee, Genetically Engineered Rice Wins USDA Approval, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/24/ 
AR2006112401153.html (“In approving the rice, the USDA allowed Bayer to take a regulatory shortcut 
and skip many of the usual safety tests by declaring that the new variety is similar to ones already 
approved, in this case two varieties of biotech rice that Bayer never commercialized because farmers did 
not want them in their fields.”); Jessica Fraser, USDA Approves Genetically Engineered Rice that 
Contaminated U.S. Food Supply; Safety Tests Skipped, NEWS TARGET, Nov. 29, 2006, 
http://www.naturalnews.com/021203.html.  
45 Gunther, supra note 40, at 77. For more on issues of international trade involving GM foods, see Debra 
M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S. Biotechnology Industry 
in the EU Ban of GM Foods, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775 (2008) (characterizing the EC-Biotech dispute as a 
disruption in trade between the United States and EU caused by their different regulatory approaches 
toward GMOs, which are in turn a reflection of the differing views and levels of concern about genetically 
modified food in the face of scientific uncertainty) [hereinafter Strauss, Impact of the WTO]. 
46 In Re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 06-md-1811, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of 
Missouri. 





strict product liability. They are seeking relief on their own behalf and on behalf of 
the other members of the proposed classes for compensatory and consequential 
damages, punitive or exemplary damages, and injunctive relief arising from the 
defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct. In August 2008, the judge overseeing the 
multidistrict litigation declined to certify it as a class action because in her view the 
mitigating responses of each farmer made their damage claims too different, such that 
“[i]ndividual circumstances affecting the calculation of individual plaintiffs’ damages 
predominate over the common issues presented in plaintiffs’ claims.” 47 This ruling 
set in motion the potential for thousands of individual trials, scheduled as “test cases” 
on typical claims. Currently federal district judge Catherine Perry in St. Louis is 
overseeing approximately 3,000 lawsuits by rice farmers alleging that Bayer 
CropScience was careless in handling its experimental, genetically modified strain of 
long-grain rice, allowing it to contaminate the national crop.48  
Since then, the individual jury verdicts in trials against Bayer have been 
mounting. In the first of the “bellwether trials,” a St. Louis jury found Bayer 
CropScience and several of its affiliates negligent and awarded over $2 million in 
compensatory damages to two Missouri long-grain rice farmers, Ken Bell and John 
Hunter, for the economic loss they suffered due to the drop in U.S. rice prices and 
much lower demand for their rice since 2006 that resulted from the contamination  
of their crops.49 The second trial awarded a total of $1.5 million to two Arkansas  
                                                 
47 In Re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 251 F.R.D. 392, 400 (E.D. Mo. 2008). Without addressing 
the merits of their claims, Judge Perry observed that:  
Some plaintiffs allege that as a result of this ban, they were forced to plant alternate, 
lower-yield seed varieties, thereby reducing the size of their harvests. Other 
plaintiffs allege that they were unable to obtain any rice seed because of the ban, and 
had to plant different crops altogether. Plaintiffs who produced rice during the 2007 
crop year incurred added costs in testing and segregating their rice to make sure it 
was free of genetically-modified traits. Land, equipment, and storage facilities were 
also contaminated and had to be cleaned to prevent further contamination. 
Id. at 394. 
48 Alison Frankel, In Bellwether Trial in Billion-Dollar MDL, Bayer Found Liable for Crop 
Contamination, Dec. 7, 2009, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, http://www.law.com. See, e.g., In Re Genetically 
Modified Rice Litigation, 2010 WL 2326036 (E.D. Mo. June 7, 2010) (pre-trial rulings granting 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims under the North Carolina Unfair Trade 
Practices Act and plaintiffs’ claims for negligence per se and for public and private nuisance; and granting 
plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment directed to certain affirmative defenses, determining as a matter 
of law that the regulations under the Plant Protection Act do not allow for low level or adventitious 
presence of regulated genetically modified rice in the commercial rice supply and declining to allow expert 
witness testimony to the contrary). For more information on the status of these lawsuits, see GM Rice 
Litigation, http://www.bayerrice litigation.com/Press.htm. 
49 Press Release, Two Missouri Rice Farmers Awarded $2 Million in First Lawsuit Heard Against German-
Based Bayer CropScience AG, Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.bayerricelitigation.com/PDFs/Press%20 
Release/bayer%20press%20release%201.pdf?action=view&id=70; see also Andrew M. Harris & Joe 
Whittington, $2 Million Verdict Against Bayer CropScience, ST. LOUIS POST, Dec. 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.stltoday.com. See In Re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 2010 WL 2926207, at *1 (E.D. 
Mo. July 20, 2010) (denying defendants’ motion for a new trial and defendants’ other post-trial motions 






long-grain rice farmers and one in Mississippi whose crops and livelihood were 
similarly harmed by the genetically modified rice. The plaintiffs’ attorney, Don 
Downing, commented, “A second consecutive verdict against Bayer should send a 
clear and strong message to the company about its negligent conduct and the damages 
that conduct actually caused to American rice farmers, not only in this case but in the 
other matters that are scheduled for trial.”50 The award calculations were “based on 
the number of acres each farmer planted and the impact of the contamination on their 
land.”51 Two state court losses followed in Arkansas, the first for about $1 million, 
including $500,000 in punitive damages. In the previous three cases, Bayer faced  
$4.5 million of judgments. The jury verdict for the fourth trial (the second state court 
loss) exceeded the prior judgments by both monetary amount and type, adding 
significant punitive damages against the biotech company of $42 million along with 
compensatory damages of $5.9 million.52 The dozen Arkansas farmers argued that, in 
addition to being negligent in its handling of the genetically modified rice, Bayer 
acted with malicious intent by not announcing the contamination of the commercial 
rice-seed pool when Bayer discovered it before the crops were sowed.53 A fifth jury 
recently awarded damages of $500,248 to a Louisiana farmer who claimed that the 
company was negligent in testing its genetically modified seed, causing a plunge in 
exports to Europe.54 As Don Downing observed: 
Five different juries under the laws of four different states in both federal and 
state courts now have unanimously found that Bayer was negligent and liable to rice 
farmers for damages. Not a single juror in any of the five trials found for Bayer.55 
These trials represent the first step Judge Perry of the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri ordered in the multidistrict litigation involving more 
than 6,000 rice producers in the five states. Bayer faces approximately 500 additional 
lawsuits in federal and state courts. As the cases continue through the summer of 
2010 with a sixth case on trial in Arkansas state court followed by a federal trial in  
St. Louis in October, a major settlement becomes increasingly likely.56 In the case of 
                                                                                                                    
including renewed motion for summary judgment that was previously denied). 
50 Press Release, Second Bayer ‘Bellwether’ Trial Results in Another Verdict for Plaintiffs: $1.5 Million 
Award to Rice Farmers in Arkansas Mississippi, Feb. 5, 2010, http://www.bayerricelitigation.com/PDFs 
/Press%20Release/bayer%20press%20release%202.pdf?newsid=117843&type_news=latest. See In Re 
Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 2010 WL 2926214, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2010) (denying 
defendants’ post-trial motions). 
51 Id. 
52 Associated Press, Jury Tells Bayer to Pay Ark. Rice Farmers $48M, April 15, 2010, 
http://www.bayerricelitigation.com/PDFs/SKELLY67_1271429373912.pdf. 
53 Id. 
54 Margaret Cronin Fisk & Joe Whittington, Bayer Loses Fifth Straight Trial Over U.S. Rice Crops, July 15, 
2010, http://greenbio.checkbiotech.org/news/ bayer_loses_fifth_straight_trial_over_us_rice_crops. 
55 Id. 
56 Plaintiffs’ attorney Downing emphasized that they will continue to push these cases to trial “until Bayer 
decides it is willing to provide fair compensation through settlement”; and mediation discussions are ongoing 
in the federal lawsuits in St. Louis. A CropScience spokesman, Greg Coffey, said the company is “hopeful 
that all parties might approach resolution in a positive and reasonable manner.” Id. See also Christopher Tritto, 





genetically modified rice, this litigation can be expected soon to reach a critical mass 
reminiscent of the tobacco litigation as previously predicted.57 Will there be a similar 
massive settlement and an accompanying shift in assumptions on the horizon? 
It is significant to note that there are no claims in the rice litigation that 
LibertyLink® harmed or risked human health. Rather, the farmers claim that the 
contamination of the commercial rice crop caused them economic loss in the 
European market for long-grain rice in sales that have not rebounded.58 If such claims 
are filed in the future on behalf of consumers for these or other genetically modified 
crops, one can only imagine the magnitude of the liability that would be faced by the 
biotech companies and possibly the farmers who planted these crops. 
B. The Foundation is Set: StarLink® Corn, Canada Canola, GM Alfalfa, 
ProdiGene, and Others  
This is not the first time such a suit has been filed in the United States due  
to outcrossing contamination. In 2004, the nation’s corn farmers received more than 
$100 million from the settlement of a case in which a genetically engineered variety 
of corn known as StarLink®, which had been approved only for animal feed, was 
found in taco shells and corn chips, among other products. StarLink®, a corn 
genetically engineered with a Cry9C protein to protect crops against certain insects, 
was considered suitable only for animal feed because of concerns that it could cause 
allergic reactions in humans; but StarLink® accidentally entered the food supply, 
prompting a large scale recall of about 300 corn products.59 Although it had been 
planted in less than one percent of U.S. corn acreage, StarLink® was found in  
22 percent of the corn samples tested by the USDA.60 After an extensive program to 
remove it, three years later StarLink® was still detected in more than one percent of 
corn samples.61 The testing/screening program was discontinued in 2008.62 
                                                                                                                    
Rice Man Cometh: Don Downing v. Bayer, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., July 23, 2010, available at 
http://stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2010/07/26/story2.html?b=1280116800^3694491 
&s=industry&i=legal. 
57 See Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 299 (“This new approach by the 
farmers—a class action so widespread that it represents the industry as a whole—if successful, may be the 
beginning of a turning tide, as was seen in the tobacco litigation.”) 
58 Id. 
59 See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 173-74; Martin A. Lee, Food Fight: International Protests 
Mount Against Genetically Engineered Crops, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, June 25, 2001, available at 
http://www.commondreams.org/ views01/0628-01.htm (“While acknowledging that nearly a half billion 
bushels of corn in storage nationwide contain StarLink, Aventis denies that it poses a health risk to humans.”). 
60 Smith, Myth, supra note 8.  
61 Id. 
62 StarLink Information Center, “FDA Withdraws STARLINK Corn Testing Guidance,” April 25, 2008, 
http://www.starlinkcorn.com/ (last visited July 25, 2010) (stating that the FDA later withdrew its requirement 
of testing/screening the U.S. corn supply to minimize the production of human food products with corn 
containing the Cry9C protein, based on an EPA White Paper that “conclude[d] that the protein has been 
sufficiently removed from the human food supply to render the level of risk low enough that continued testing 
for the protein in yellow corn at dry mills and mass production facilities provides no added public health 
protection.”); FDA, Guidance for Industry on the Food and Drug Administration Recommendations for 






In addition, the cross-contamination had an impact on international trade, 
causing a drop in Japanese imports of U.S. corn by 1.3 million metric tons (8 percent 
in volume terms) in 2001.63 The Japanese government now mandates the segregation 
of unapproved biotechnology food and feed ingredients from the export channel, with 
a zero tolerance for unapproved GM varieties that are found in foods.64 
As a result of the StarLink® corn contamination, consumers and farmers in 
class action lawsuits sued the biotech manufacturer, Aventis, under several theories of 
liability, including negligence, strict liability, and nuisance.65 This incident has been 
scrutinized as a lesson that “if a company makes a mistake in commercializing a 
transgenic crop, the cost of civil liability for food biotechnology can be very high.”66 In 
this case, the company shouldered the cost of recalling the product and destroying the 
remaining seed inventory, detecting and eliminating any residual StarLink® in the U.S. 
corn supply, and settling class actions with consumers who allegedly suffered allergic 
reactions (despite the fact that no such reactions were proven) for nine million dollars 
and corn growers who allegedly suffered depressed corn prices as a result for another 
$110 million.67 Aventis ultimately sold its crop science unit to Bayer, the same division 
that is now facing the consequences of its second contamination debacle with 
LibertyLink® rice.68  
Most significantly in terms of liability, the StarLink® cases confirmed that 
“negligence, negligence per se, strict liability in tort, trespass, private nuisance, public 
nuisance, and others are all theories under which the company which markets a product 
might be liable for damage that would result.”69 Although the lawsuits were settled and 
there was no decision on the merits of the case, these bases for legal liability for crop 
contamination did survive a motion to dismiss.70 In addition, the foundation was 
established for a new concept of economic loss—that the contamination of the crop 
caused a depressing effect on the prices of an entire crop market, and every farmer who 
sold any corn that year was in fact damaged because of depressed prices—a notion that 
could also apply when a genetically engineered crop is fully approved in the U.S. but is 
                                                                                                                    
Sampling and Testing Yellow Corn and Dry-Milled Yellow Corn Shipments Intended for Human Food Use 
for Cry9C Protein Residues; Withdrawal of Guidance, 73 Fed. Reg. 22716 (April 25, 2008). 
63 James Stamps, Trade in Biotechnology Food Products, INT’L ECON. REV. 5, 13-14 (2002). 
64 Id. at 14; see also CropChoice News, Japan Shuns Corn over GE Issue, Organic Consumers 
Association, Apr. 9, 2001, available at http://www.purefood.org/gefood/japanshuns.cfm. See The Organic 
and Non-GMO Report, Japan’s legislation on labeling of genetically engineered foods, http://www.non-
gmoreport.com/Japan_legislation_labeling_GM_foods.php (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
65 In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see Cox, 
supra note 3, at 411. 
66 Donald Uchtmann, Liability Issues: Lessons from StarLink, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 23 (2004). 
67 Id. 
68 Gunther, supra note 40, at 76. 
69 Uchtmann, supra note 66, at 23. 
70 Id.; Grossman, supra note 27, at 120-21 (analyzing judge’s treatment of private and public nuisance 
claims in allowing StarLink litigation to proceed on these theories); Starlink, 212 F. Supp 2d at 848. But 
see Cox, supra note 3, at 412 (viewing this question of legal liability as open because there was no decision 
on the merits of this case). 





not approved in major export markets.71 This economic loss doctrine is now being 
successfully tested in the LibertyLink® rice litigation.  
Similarly, in Canada, two certified organic farmers brought a class action 
against Monsanto Canada and Aventis (later amended to be Bayer CropScience) in 
2002 for damages resulting from the widespread contamination of their crops by GM 
canola and for an injunction to prevent the commercial introduction of GM wheat.72 
The genetically herbicide-resistant canola inexplicably appeared to have spread to a 
wild relative.73 The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of losing their organic 
certification and their ability to grow and market organic canola after Monsanto’s 
Roundup Ready® canola and Bayer’s Liberty Link® canola had been found growing 
on their land, “few, if any, certified organic grain farmers are now growing canola. 
The crop, as an important tool in the crop rotations of organic farmers, and as an 
organic grain commodity, has been lost to certified organic farmers in 
Saskatchewan.”74 They based their liability claims on the tort theories of: negligence, 
for the seed companies’ breaching their duty “to ensure that their GM canola would 
not infiltrate and contaminate farmland . . . to warn growers about cross-pollination 
and . . . to advise growers of farming practices that would limit the spread of their 
GM canola”; nuisance that “interfered with certified organic grain farmers’ use and 
enjoyment of their land”; strict liability for “having engaged in a non-natural use of 
land, and allowing the escape of something likely to do mischief and damage”; and 
trespass for the “introduction of GM canola and its unconfined release” into the 
environment.75 However, in that case the judge denied the motion for class 
certification and indicated doubt as to the viability of some of these claims. She found 
that, although some farmers may have been hurt, there was no evidence that organic 
farmers as a class have suffered because some of them were able to find markets for 
their canola; moreover, there lacked a plausible legal basis for imposing liability on 
the defendant on the grounds of negligence (for want of duty of care), nuisance, and 
trespass.76 
Unfortunately, other examples are becoming increasingly abundant, 
producing mounting evidence of safety breaches that may soon surpass mere 
negligence. In the summer of 2006, creeping bentgrass under development by the 
                                                 
71 Uchtmann, supra note 66, at 23. 
72 Hoffman and Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada, Sask. Q.B., No. 67 of 2002, http://www.saskorganic.com 
/oapf/pdf/amended-claim.pdf.  
73 Martin Philipson, Agricultural Law: Containing the GM Revolution, 48 BIOTECHNOLOGY & DEV. 
MONITOR 2 (Dec. 2001), cited in Rachel Durkee Walker & Jill Doerfler, Wild Rice: The Minnesota 
Legislature, a Distinctive Crop, GMOs, and OJIBWE Perspectives, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 519 (2009) 
(statement to Missouri legislature citing examples of the dangers of GMOs). 
74 Statement of Claim in the Court of Queen's Bench, http:// www.saskorganic.com/oapf/pdf/stmt-of-
claim.pdf (Jan. 10, 2002). 
75 Id.; see also Jane Matthews Glenn, Footloose: Civil Responsibility for GMO Gene Wandering in 
Canada, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 547, 551 (2004). 
76 Lara Khoury & Stuart Smyth, Reasonable Foreseeability and Liability in Relation to Genetically Modified 
Organisms, 27 BUL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 215, 221 (2007). See generally Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Hoffman v. 
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Scotts Miracle-Gro Company and Monsanto was discovered to have escaped into the 
wild from Oregon test sites that had been used a few years earlier.77 The genetically 
engineered grass (GTCB), intended for use on golf courses and not yet approved by 
the USDA, contained a bacterial gene that made it resistant to the herbicide 
glyphosate, sold commercially as Roundup®. Apparently the wind had dispersed the 
seeds and the pollen had crossed with other varieties. Scientists have expressed 
concern that the variety will cross pollinate with other grass varieties and may 
contaminate the commercial grass seed supply—70 percent of which is grown in 
Oregon.78 Another risk is the creation of “superweeds,” making the weedy grasses 
harder to control with glyphosate, a widely used herbicide and leading to more toxic 
herbicides.79 In the litigation that ensued, the plaintiffs alleged that by permitting the 
field tests, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) had violated the 
Plant Protection Act (PPA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).80 They claimed that APHIS had failed 
to consider whether this crop is a plant pest under the PPA, evaluate the 
environmental impact under NEPA, and follow its own regulations. The court held 
that the denial of plaintiffs’ petition to list GTCB as a noxious weed was arbitrary and 
capricious, as was its failure to require an environmental impact assessment.81 
In another case in Hawaii, a federal judge in August 2006 ruled that the 
drug-producing GM crops grown in Hawaii violated both the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) and NEPA.82 Several companies had run field tests from 2001 to 2003 of 
corn and sugarcane genetically engineered to produce experimental vaccines, 
hormones, and cancer-fighting agents. In view of concerns for Hawaii’s fragile 
ecosystem, the court held that APHIS had violated ESA because it had failed to 
obtain information about endangered and threatened species in the area of the permits 
and NEPA for failing to prepare an environmental assessment or impact statement.83 
                                                 
77 Andrew Pollack, Grass Created in Lab is Found in the Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006, available  
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/16/science/16grass.html, cited in Walker & Doerfler, supra note 73,  
at 518 (as evidence that the regulators are not regulating) [hereinafter Pollack, Grass]. 
78 Smith, Whistleblower, supra note 16. 
79 Pollack, Grass, supra note 77; see also William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope with 
Roundup-Resistant Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/ 
business/energy-environment/04weed.html? ref=food_prices (Roundup-resistant weeds like horseweed and 
giant ragweed are forcing farmers to spray fields with more toxic herbicides and to use more expensive 
techniques previously abandoned— more labor-intensive methods like pulling weeds and regular 
plowing.). The National Research Council has also issued its own warning about the emergence of resistant 
weeds and other risks as limiting the potential benefits of GM crops. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
IMPACT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (April 13, 
2010), available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/ genengcrops.pdf. 
80 International Center for Technology Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2007). 
The Scotts Company intervened in the case as a defendant. See Grossman, supra note 27, at 147-149 
(discussing this case and others as illustrating the type of environmental damage feared from GM crops). 
81 473 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30; Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7758; Administrative Procedure Act,  
5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f. 
82 Center for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1182-83 (D. Haw. 2006). 
83 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. See Grossman, supra note 27, at 149-51. 





However, by the time this court decision took place, the field tests had already been 
completed and the potential damage done. As further evidence of this type of harm, 
in September 2004 citizen groups revealed that tests of nearly 20,000 papaya seeds 
on the Big Island of Hawaii determined that half were genetically modified; to make 
matters worse, 80 percent were from organic farms, while 20 percent were from 
home gardens and wild papaya trees.84 Likewise in Japan, although transgenic canola 
is not grown commercially there, it was discovered growing near some ports and 
roadsides; scientists theorized that imported seeds had escaped during transportation 
to oil-processing facilities.85  
Additional controversies have occurred in California, where in two separate 
federal lawsuits plaintiffs, consisting of farmers, the Sierra Club, and other consumer 
organizations, successfully challenged the USDA’s decision to deregulate 
Monsanto’s glyphosate-resistant sugar beets and alfalfa despite considerable 
questions about potential environmental degradation and without an environmental 
impact statement (EIS).86 In the GM sugar beet case, the District Judge ruled in 
September 2009 that the USDA failed to adequately assess the environmental impact 
of Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® sugar beets before introducing them into the food 
supply, but in a later decision denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.87 
In the GM alfalfa case, in 2008 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the District Court’s 2007 decision issuing an injunction and ordering 
an EIS.88 However, on June 21, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7 to 1 in favor of 
Monsanto, stating in its opinion that the District Court had abused its discretion in 
granting an injunction prohibiting partial deregulation of the Roundup Ready® alfalfa. 
APHIS must still complete the EIS, but can decide to partially deregulate the alfalfa, 
allowing it to be planted before the EIS is finished.89 As the Supreme Court’s “first-
ever ruling on genetically modified crops,” this decision was viewed as “a victory for 
Monsanto and others in the agricultural biotechnology industry, with potential 
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85 Pollack, Grass, supra note 77, cited in Walker & Doerfler, supra note 73 (as example of danger of 
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86 Center for Food Safety et al. v. Vilsack, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009) (APHIS required to 
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87 See Caroline Scott-Thomas, Judge rules against Monsanto’s GM sugar beets, Food navigator-usa.com, Sept. 
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964017, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (denial of injunction in Roundup Ready® sugar beet litigation). In weighing the 
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89 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761 (2010). 






implications for other cases.”90 Yet this impact may be overstated, as the ruling was 
by its terms narrow and limited.91 The Supreme Court did not go so far as to approve 
the GM alfalfa or address safety concerns; at most, it shifted some regulatory 
responsibility away from the courts and back on the regulatory agencies charged in 
the first instance with these oversight responsibilities. 
In another incident back in 2002, an experimental crop of corn engineered by 
ProdiGene to produce pharmaceuticals began sprouting in soybean fields designated for 
human and animal consumption near the company’s Nebraska and Iowa sites.92 The 
USDA seized 500,000 bushels of tainted soybeans before they reached the market and 
charged ProdiGene nearly $3 million in fines and disposal costs. The culprit in that 
contamination was not only pollen drift but the commingling of plants from improper 
handling, prompting APHIS to propose tightening guidelines for field testing plant-
made pharmaceuticals (PMPs) to mandate that no food crops could be grown in the 
same field in the following planting season and that experimental PMPs be grown 
further away from conventional crops, as well as the use of segregated equipment and 
cleaning protocols.93 Even conventional food and grain producers and the National 
Corn Growers Association call for more stringent requirements.94 As these events have 
demonstrated, potential liability is not merely theoretical; as a consequence, “[u]nless 
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companies and the agencies that regulate them implement safeguards to prevent these 
food-safety fears from becoming a reality, this biotech method of drug production faces 
an unsteady future.”95 
C. The Suppliers Demand: Ventria Rice, Anheuser-Busch, and the Role of 
Trade Associations 
In the marketplace rules of biotechnology, suppliers can have a significant 
impact. In large measure they have been sensitive to consumer preference and steered 
clear of GM crops, clearly making these demands known to the farmers and biotech 
companies. An example came recently in the context of GM drug-producing rice and 
beer. When a small biotechnology company, Ventria Biosciences, revealed its plans to 
insert human genes into rice plants to produce two proteins normally found in breast 
milk, tears, and saliva, to create “therapeutic food products to treat stomach disorders,” 
Anheuser-Busch threatened to boycott all Missouri rice. The company feared 
contamination of the rice plants that are a key ingredient in its beer.96 Although the 
state of Missouri listened and Anheuser-Busch succeeded in protecting its supply of 
rice plants there, while California similarly sustained its farmers’ objections, Ventria 
simply moved to a less resistant locale; in May 2005, USDA approved Ventria’s 
application for pharma rice plants on up to 3,200 acres in Kansas instead.97 
Because using this GM method to produce drugs in mass quantities of field 
plantings is less costly than a traditional biotechnology factory, several other 
biotechnology companies are experimenting with variations of drug-producing 
plants.98 A consulting firm forecasts that plant-manufactured drugs will expand into a 
$2.2 billion-per-year industry by 2011.99 
Experts warn that pollen from GM drug plants could drift into fields 
containing food crops and create contaminated hybrids; or a bird could ingest the 
bioengineered seeds and deposit them in a field hundreds of miles away.100 Along 
with risks to the consumer and the environment come significant potential 
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consequences for international trade, as $1.3 billion in annual U.S. rice sales to 
foreign countries are at stake.101 As was seen in the above examples, if drugs migrate 
into commodity crops, many of these countries, already wary of biotech crops, would 
buy their agricultural products elsewhere.102 
Opponents to these pharma crops include consumer and environmental 
advocates, and many farmers, and farmer organizations such as the American Farm 
Bureau and the National Farmers Union. Even others in industry have resisted the use of 
biotech crops for drug production; the U.S. Rice Federation, an industry group, opposed 
Ventria’s pharma rice, pointing to LibertyLink® and asserting that it does not believe the 
USDA can protect “the environment and the public’s food and feed supply from 
unwanted intrusions of genetically engineered materials.”103 The agency itself inspires 
little confidence with its track record of environmental and food contamination from 
escaped GMOs. In an internal audit of APHIS in 2005, the USDA’s inspector general 
disclosed that the agency charged with regulating field trials had no knowledge of the 
location of some field trials, did no independent testing of nearby crops, and failed to 
require biotech firms to submit protocols.104 Citing multiple inadequacies, the report 
observed: “In fact, at various stages of the field test process—from approval of 
applications to inspection of fields—weaknesses in APHIS regulations and internal 
management controls increase the risk that regulated genetically engineered organisms 
(GEO) will inadvertently persist in the environment before they are deemed safe to grow 
without regulation.”105 The audit concluded: “APHIS’ current regulations, policies, and 
procedures do not go far enough to ensure the safe introduction of agricultural 
biotechnology.”106 Moreover, a 2004 report by the National Research Council urged the 
government to improve its management and supervision, but acknowledged that “there is 
no way to guarantee that field trialed crops will not pollute the environment.”107 
Allowing the industry to monitor itself is essentially a tort waiting to happen. 
Thus, trade associations have become proactive in having their voices fill the 
regulatory void. In addition to the U.S. Rice Federation, other examples include the 
American Soybean Association, representing farmers who face potential nuisance 
liability suits, which asked seed manufacturers not to sell unapproved varieties 
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commercially and set minimum requirements for segregating unapproved GM 
soybeans.108 “These steps have helped to avoid commingling of approved varieties with 
GM varieties not acceptable to trading partners, particularly in the EU.”109 To minimize 
impediments to trade, the National Corn Growers Association has also advised its 
members to be aware of the approval status of the seed they select and to direct those 
that are not approved by the EU into the domestic market not into export channels.110  
In addition, in the case of Agrisure RW corn (MIR604, developed by Syngenta to be 
resistant to rootworm), the North American Export Grain Association voiced opposition, 
citing Syngenta’s “erosion of corporate responsibility to maintain major export markets 
… [and] disregard of the single largest market for US corn, Japan.”111 The 
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), which has over 1100 members, launched its 
own Product Launch Stewardship Policy in May 2007 in part to avoid trade disruptions 
by targeting key markets that will accept GMOs.112 However, industry cannot be relied 
on to self-police, as it must be remembered that their motivation comes from their own 
financial interests (i.e., fear of lawsuits) and its priority of promoting these genetically 
engineered products as long as they are profitable still remains.113  
D. The International Marketplace Rules 
As evidenced in the above instances, concern for international trade fuels  
the actions of farmers and trade organizations. It would be logical to expect, then, that 
the strict regulatory approach of the international community should have an impact 
on the domestic agenda. Although it has lifted its moratorium on the approval of GM 
foods, the EU still maintains its stringent labeling and approval directives, which 
make the introduction of GMOs a far slower process and necessitate segregating U.S. 
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crops that might enter export channels.114 The EU also balances complex issues of 
national sovereignty that must be taken into consideration when faced with the 
attempts of its member states to assert control of their countries’ food supplies and 
erect additional barriers against GMOs.115 Another important trading partner, Japan, 
maintains its zero tolerance policy for unapproved GMOs as well as strict handling 
and labeling guidelines.116 
Even more broadly, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety embodies an 
international consensus with which U.S. law and trade policy conflict.117 As an 
important precedent, the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling on EU-Biotech in 
its support of the U.S. position undermined the authority of the Biosafety Protocol, 
which allows its member states to take a precautionary approach to regulating GMOs 
when there is scientific uncertainty.118 Dennis Olson, Director of the Trade  
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and Agriculture Project at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), 
noted that: 
There is already a broad international consensus on how to handle 
GE crops at the international level established at the Cartagena 
Protocol. This consensus acknowledges that each country has the 
right to regulate GE crops based on precautionary principles, to 
require labeling of GE crops, and to protect farmers and others 
from unfair liability arising from the release of GE crops into the 
environment and food distribution system. Now, the WTO’s 
unelected legal tribunal, at the request of the U.S. government, has 
chosen to pre-empt a strong democratic international consensus.119  
Critics have identified the problem of disrupted trade and economic loss 
caused by these conflicting systems: “The sale in the United States of a biotech crop 
that cannot be exported to the E.U. represents an economic threat to crops bound for 
export … These crops cannot reach their intended market if the unapproved biotech 
crop mixes with it in the field, through pollen drift, a ‘volunteer’ emerging from grain 
left on the ground in a prior harvest, or through post-harvest commingling.”120 The 
inconsistency with international standards and principles will continue to lead to trade 
obstacles until the U.S. biotech industry conforms its practices.121 
E. The Voice of the People: Channeled through Legislation? 
Biotechnology companies and the farmers who grow GM crops may face 
more potential liability under federal and state statutes in the future. New legislation 
has been proposed that has thus far been largely unsuccessful in obtaining approval.122  
At the federal level, only bills supporting biotechnology passed during the 
most recent five-year period reported by the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 
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(PIFB) (2001-2006).123 None of the GM-restrictive legislation in this area was enacted, 
but several bills were introduced.124 In May 2002, H.R. 4814 was one of five bills 
introduced by Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) that sought to expand the 
regulation of agricultural biotechnology. H.R. 4812, the Genetically Engineered Crop 
and Animal Farmer Protection Act, would “provide additional protections for farmers 
and ranchers that may be harmed economically by genetically engineered seeds, plants, 
or animals,” establishing a Farmer’s Bill of Rights “to ensure fairness for farmers and 
ranchers in their dealings with biotechnology companies that sell genetically engineered 
seeds, plants, or animals.”125 Among these protections, the bill would require disclosure 
by the biotechnology companies of the legal and environmental risks that the use of the 
genetically engineered seeds, plants, or animals may pose to the purchaser; prevent 
noncompetitive practices involving technology fees; preclude the biotechnology 
company from limiting liability for harm that may result from the release of genetically 
engineered material into the environment; and prohibit the sale of certain nonfertile 
plant seeds (a seed that is genetically engineered to produce a plant whose seeds are not 
capable of reproduction). Finally, H.R. 4816, the Genetically Engineered Organism 
Liability Act, would hold biotechnology companies liable to any party for injuries 
caused by the release of a genetically engineered organism into the environment.126 The 
list of potential injuries included crop failures suffered by farmers, cross pollination of 
neighboring farms, and increased insect resistance, as well as health and environmental 
impacts on consumers.127 All of these proposals died in subcommittees.  
Nevertheless, Rep. Kucinich has again introduced similar bills in the current 
Congress.128 The purpose of these bills is: 
To provide additional protections for farmers and ranchers that may 
be harmed economically by genetically engineered seeds, plants, or 
animals, to ensure fairness for farmers and ranchers in their 
dealings with biotech companies that sell genetically engineered 
seeds, plants, or animals, to assign liability for injury caused by 
genetically engineered organisms, and for other purposes.129 
The Genetically Engineered Organism Liability Act of 2010 further states 
that: “(1) a biotech company shall be liable to any party injured by the release of a 
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genetically engineered organism into the environment if the injury results from such 
genetic engineering; and (2) liability may not be waived or otherwise avoided by 
contract.”130 Introduced on June 23, 2010, the bills were submitted to the appropriate 
House committees. 
The most recent PIFB report on state legislative activity indicates that in 
2005, increasing initiatives arose at the state and local levels. Michael Fernandez, 
executive director of the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, explained: “As 
agricultural biotechnology progresses, and farmers, the food industry and 
consumers continue to adapt to it, state legislatures are at the forefront. States 
sometimes have little choice but to address new policy issues, even before they 
emerge at the federal level.”131 State legislatures increasingly introduced bills that 
attempted to preempt local and county initiatives to limit or prohibit GM seeds and 
crops, prompted by concerns that local regulations could be inconsistent with, and 
more restrictive than, statewide policies.132  
In addition, states sought to balance the competing interests of different 
stakeholders. While many of the bills supported agricultural biotechnology as a 
means of promoting economic growth, others aimed to manage the potential 
economic conflicts between farmers who use GM crops and those using 
conventional or organic techniques. This category of “liability and contracts” 
encompassed 15% of the bills introduced in 2005-2006 and 11% of adopted 
legislation in 2005-2006, compared to 3% in 2003-2004.133 Most notable was 
legislation proposed in Vermont (“the Farmer Protection Act”) that was vetoed by 
the Governor. Prompted by concerns about the unintended presence of GM crops in 
conventional and organic crops, this bill (SB 18) would have held manufacturers 
strictly liable for damage caused by GM material, while an alternate House version 
(HB 309) would have required that manufacturers be found negligent to be held 
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responsible.134 Some of the proposed legislation aimed to impose moratoria on GM 
crops and animals (16%, as compared to 6% in 2003-2004); 8% proposed to 
impose labeling requirements (compared to 7%); 9% involved studies and 
taskforces (compared to 19%); and 1% concerned crop destruction (compared to a 
similarly small number in 2003-2004).135 Through these conflicting bills, the states 
attempted to implement coexistence strategies.136 
Of the total bills and resolutions introduced in state legislatures in 2005-2006, 
27 (20%) passed.137 Most of the new state laws supported biotechnology, disallowed 
local and county initiatives, or criminalized the destruction of crops. Only a few of the 
many labeling bills introduced were adopted: Alaska enacted a labeling statute (SB 25), 
which requires that GM fish be conspicuously labeled before being sold for human 
consumption; Maine provided for voluntary labeling of foods designated as GM free 
(LD 1733); and Vermont mandated labeling of seed as GM (HB 777).138 In addition, 
one bill on the subject of liability and agricultural contracts previously became law in 
Illinois.139  
Calls have been renewed for a greater statutory response, particularly on the 
state level.140 Some experts prefer these decisions be made by the legislatures rather 
than the courts: “An appropriate statutory and regulatory regime enacted with the 
purpose of establishing standards of care for growers of GE crops would place the 
important policy questions presented by gene flow squarely in the hands of the political 
branches of government.”141 As the voice of consumers grows stronger, and as word of 
contamination and potentially other incidents spreads, so do the prospects that United 
States may react to a changing political climate with the passage of new federal and 
state legislation that clearly delineates liability for the future harms caused by 
genetically modified crops and GMOs in food. 
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available at http://www.legis.state.ia.us/lasdocs/IntComHand/2006/IHDLA016.pdf.  
141 Cannon, supra note 22, at 679 (preferring legislative and administrative statements on standards of care 
to the courts’ in private tort actions); see also Kanchana Kariyawasam, Legal Liability, Intellectual 
Property and Genetically Modified Crops: Their Impact on World Agriculture, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 
459, 482 (2010) (analyzing the level of protection provided by Australia’s Gene Technology Act of 2000 
and arguing that it should be strengthened by following the liability legislation of Germany, which 
“allocates liability for the financial risk arising from the cultivation of GMOs, with a general focus on 
responsible parties meeting the costs and a clear intent to protect non-GM farmers”).  





IV.   PROPOSALS FOR INDUSTRY AND THE STAKEHOLDERS 
In considering the best measures to manage these risks, first and foremost 
would be a U.S. regulatory approach that would implement labeling, monitoring, and 
a stringent pre-market approval process.142 The most effective notification 
mechanism both for consumers in the United States and importers from abroad would 
be mandatory positive labeling indicating the presence or possible presence of 
GMOs—those products “made with GM ingredients” or that “may contain 
genetically modified ingredients.” Voluntary negative labeling for foods that are “not 
made with GM processes” or “not produced through bioengineering,” while a 
positive marketing tool to consumers, alone will not be adequate.143 Following the 
recommendations of the National Research Council, the United States should 
implement a safety assessment prior to and after commercialization, involve federal 
agencies in the determination, use standardized sampling methodologies, and 
improve tracing and tracking methods.144 Changes in the storage and transportation 
structure are also necessary to segregate more effectively biotechnology agricultural 
products from conventional varieties.145 
In addition, legislation should be passed—preferably on the federal level to 
prevent a patchwork of inconsistent state laws—that would clearly place liability onto 
the manufacturers of GM products. Local grass roots initiatives to further protect 
gardens and farmlands from GMOs contamination should not be suppressed at either 
the state or federal level. The ownership of these products has already been 
established through patents. Making tort law consistent with intellectual property law 
would be both logical and sound as a matter of public policy. With ownership comes 
great responsibility and—depending on how those products are conceived and 
produced—potential liability. 
Liability would most appropriately be based on a torts theory where 
manufacturers would be held strictly liable for the injuries caused by their biotech 
products, including harm to the environment, human health, and economic loss due to 
loss of international markets.146 Holding biotech companies liable for the results of 
their genetic engineering would comport with public policy because it would shift 
liability to those best able to control the product, ensure its safety, conduct rigorous 
testing, and disseminate critical information such as the size of buffer zones needed 
                                                 
142 See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 189-95 (proposing that, like the EU and international 
community, the United States adopt a more cautious model of labeling and monitoring); see also Strauss, 
Ethical Implications, supra note 15, at 8-9 (discussing the failed promise of this technology and presenting 
an ethical framework in support of labeling and monitoring).  
143 Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 193-94. 
144 Id. at 194 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAFETY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS: 
APPROACHES TO ASSESSING UNINTENDED HEALTH EFFECTS 3-4 (July 2004), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/html/ge_foods/ge-foods-reportbrief.pdf). 
145 Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 195. 
146 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Barbara A. Boczar, Biotechnology and Tort Liability, A Strategic Industry at 
Risk, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 791, 794 (1994) (arguing that, absent a special liability system, the costs of 
liability will make the biotech industry uncompetitive internationally). 






around GM plants. This approach would put responsibility and thus incentives in the 
proper place. In the absence of regulation by the FDA and USDA/APHIS, the biotech 
companies are in the best position to self-police their genetically engineered creations 
and more likely to do so if they will be held accountable for any injuries that flow as 
a consequence.  
The most difficult hurdle for potential plaintiffs in cases involving 
environmental and human injury will be proving causation but, like the tobacco 
industry model, when a scientific breakthrough in this area occurs through studies 
and unfortunately an incident or health crisis, liability and change will follow. It 
would be in the best interests of the industry as well as the public to be proactive and 
work to be sure that these products do not carry such risks. In the face of current 
scientific uncertainty, who should bear the risks of these products? In the U.S. 
regulatory world the answer of the responsible agencies charged in this area has been 
the public. Unlike the stringent regulatory approach of the EU and the international 
community which reacts in the opposite manner to the scientific uncertainty and 
places the burden on the biotech companies to prove safety before allowing these 
products into the market, the United States takes a laissez faire approach and does not 
provide a regulatory structure or special restrictions for these products.147 
While it would be preferable to restrict GM products at the outset before 
they have been let loose on the public in its food supply, this approach does not 
appear to be on the horizon. As a conservative estimate, more than 75 percent of the 
products in U.S. grocery stores contain GM ingredients.148 Most recently, the FDA 
has extended this approach and, arguably, exacerbated this situation by approving the 
use of milk and meat from cloned animals without labeling or monitoring, using the 
same reasoning of “substantial equivalence” that it has used for GM foods.149 
At the same time, organics are becoming big business. Americans’ 
purchases have increased by twenty percent each year and organic producers are 
being bought out by big companies like Kellogg and Kraft; even megastores like 
Walmart have added organic food lines admittedly because of the economics driven 
by customer preferences.150 Consumer demand is filling the void left by 
                                                 
147 See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 176-89 (analyzing the U.S. and EU regulatory 
treatment of GMOs); Strauss, A Model of Labeling, supra note 102, at 97-107; see also David G. Owen, 
Bending Nature, Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 569, 571 (2010) (“It is the job of law, drawing from 
customs, morals, and practical politics, to prescribe who bears the economic risk of harmful consequences 
from bending nature—those who exploit it or those who are harmed thereby.”).  
148 The Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA) estimates that 75% of all processed foods in the United 
States contain a GM ingredient, including almost every product with a corn or soy ingredient and some 
containing canola or cottonseed oil. See Americans Clueless About Gene-Altered Foods (Mar. 23, 2005), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7277844/ (statement of Stephanie Childs, Grocery Manufacturers of 
America); see also IRT, supra note 4. 
149 See Animal Cloning Risk Assessment, 73 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 16, 2008); FDA, CVM and Animal 
Cloning, http://www.fda.gov/cvm/cloning.htm (last visited July 30, 2010). 
150 Food, Inc., supra note 3; see also MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA 154-58 (Penguin 
Books 2006) (discussing the growth of the organic food industry). 





administrative agencies and the government.151 Perhaps the private sector can 
likewise spur the biotech industry to make food safety a priority.  
As a general matter, the business world prefers certainty and clear standards 
to meet.152 Ironically, in the absence of federal standards, the industry cannot avail 
itself of the state of the art or government specification defenses.153 Shifting this 
dilemma to the private sector in the lawsuit arena would, paradoxically, provide some 
structure to manage the risks. A clear federal statute demarking liability would 
provide the most certain signal to the stakeholder parties. If that does not come to 
pass, the common law of torts will step in to fill the void, plaintiff by plaintiff, and 
ultimately through the powerful class action vehicle.154  
It should be noted that assumption of risk could not be used as a defense to a 
product liability claim by the biotech industry unless the products were clearly 
labeled as genetically modified and the public warned of any potential hazards. The 
consumer must be aware of whether a product contains GM ingredients, along with 
the potential risks; and voluntarily assume these risks through their purchases and 
intentional ingestion of these foods.155 Of course, this labeling and informational 
campaign approach would only enable the assumption of risk defense to be raised; a 
                                                 
151 Food, Inc., supra note 3. However, organics alone are not the answer because, due to higher prices and 
limited availability, they are effectively out of reach for many consumers. Change must occur at the policy 
level, as the government still has a responsibility to the American public to guaranty the safety of the 
mainstream food supply for the average consumer. See Strauss, Ethical Implications, supra note 15, at 28. 
152 “Some scientists and biotechnology executives say that by having the Food and Drug Administration spell 
out the rules of the game, big investors would finally be willing to put up money to create a market in so-
called transgenic livestock.” Andrew Pollack, Without U.S. Rules, Biotech Food Lacks Investors,  
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2007 (Barbara Glenn, the managing director for animal issues at the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization, a trade group, publically supports tougher standards: “Our overarching goal is to have 
public confidence in our products. We won’t have that unless we have a very strong review process.”).  
153 The state of the art defense is available in many products liability and toxic torts cases, founded upon 
the notion that since little or no knowledge of the hazard in question existed at the time, the manufacturer 
or other defendant responsible for the alleged hazard should not be held liable. However, the degree of 
success of this defense depends entirely on the jury; while it may limit the amount of damages, most juries 
will not allow this defense to avoid liability altogether. See Louis Genevie, The State-of-the-Art Defense, 
For the Defense (1992), available at http://www.litstrat.com/Articles/STATE_OF_ART_DEFENSE.pdf. 
See generally CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & DIANE SAVAGE, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 
STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 353 (6th ed. 2010) (discussing components and viability of state-of-
the-art defense, with availability varying by state). The government-contractor defense may be available in 
cases where the product was a joint venture with the government or produced under a contract according to 
specifications set by the government. Id. at 352. 
154 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 3, at 417 (exploring common law tort claims and proposing state legislation to 
protect farmers by holding growers and manufacturers liable for the harm); see also Khoury & Smyth, 
supra note 76, at 11 (making a similar observation regarding the absence of statutes in Canada and, as a 
consequence, common law tort actions stepping in to fill in the void); Blake Denton, Regulating the 
Regulators: The Increased Role for the Federal Judiciary in Monitoring the Debate over Genetically 
Modified Crops, 25 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 333 (2007) (observing that in the absence of a stricter 
regulatory structure and oversight in the United States, more such lawsuits are likely to be brought in the 
coming years by opponents of GMOs). 
155 Under the doctrine of assumption of risk, when a person “voluntarily and unreasonably assumes the risk 
of a known danger, the manufacturer is not liable for any resulting injury.” BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra  
note 153, at 350. 
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jury would still have to be satisfied that these risks were clearly undertaken by the 
consumer. Moreover, a manufacturer’s responsibility to the public and greater ability 
to minimize these risks should ultimately be given more weight in the equation to 
assess liability. Nonetheless, there may be reduced costs in the form of a significantly 
diminished risk of liability from lawsuits, at least with respect to potential claims for 
injuries that may occur due to a failure to warn.156 Since such labeling and warnings 
are not currently required under federal law, voluntary labeling and information 
dissemination would be a wise approach for biotech. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the risks of harm to human health and the environment, as 
translated into these multifaceted layers of legal liability, may justify a moratorium or 
ban in the use of GMOs in food and commercial medical applications. Until then, 
individual farmers would be better able to make choices about whether to plant GM 
crops if they are made aware of their potential liability and given critical information 
such as the need for sufficient buffer zones and proper segregation methods—
including the cost of leaving large tracts of their land fallow, testing their crops, and 
cleaning their equipment—in order to minimize their legal jeopardy. Through their 
own evaluation of costs and benefits, these farmers may decide that any involvement 
with GMOs is not worth engendering these hazards and expenses. Perhaps additional 
measures can be developed to protect non-GM farmers and empower them to 
segregate and protect their crops, such as developing a non-GM certification and 
requiring special handling before their products enter the domestic market or export 
channels.157 
Most importantly, biotech companies must be sent a clear message that they 
will be held financially accountable for the harm caused by their genetically 
engineered products—injuries and damages that are no longer merely theoretical. As 
landmark multimillion dollar cases such as the LibertyLink® rice litigation proceed 
through the courts, this message is reaching a crescendo. Perhaps statutory liability 
and a transformation in the regulatory regime will follow. Through this risk analysis, 
the industry might be persuaded that safety is good business to ensure that, in the 
long-run, they continue to reap what they sow. 
156 See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 192. 
157 See, e.g., Ken Roseboro, “Certification Seen As a Key to Success in Non-GMO Markets,” Jan. 5, 2004, 
http://www.non-gm-farmers.com/news_print.asp?ID=960; Non-GMO Project, http://www.nongmo 
project.org/industry/become-non-gmo-project-verified/ (“The Non-GMO Project offers North America’s 
only independent verification for products made according to best practices for GMO avoidance.”); Cert ID 
Non-GMO Standard, http://www.cert-id.eu/Certification-Programmes/NonGMO.aspx (international independent 
certification company based in Europe). 
